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Travel writers, award-winning Canadian travel author Charles Montgomery tells us in The Shark God, work as follows: they contact a country’s tourist agency, promise to write glowing stories and then ask for “free flights, hotels, meals, and booze. Especially booze.” They then spend weeks “lounging in crisp linen sheets [and] watching BBC World News.”
That certainly wasn’t Montgomery’s approach to his book. The Shark God tells of Montgomery trying to follow the travels of his great-grandfather, a missionary in the islands of Melanesia in 1892. It is a humorous and insightful personal exploration of culture, religion, superstition and faith that may rank among the year’s best.
Montgomery’s great-grandfather, an Anglican bishop, set out “to bring the One True God to the heathens” of Melanesia. At age 10, Montgomery found his great-grandfather’s account of his journeys. To a young mind, the memoir was the family equivalent of Treasure Island or any other classic adventure story, only this was “an adventure sanctioned by God Himself.” When Montgomery rediscovered the writings some 20 years later, they resonated differently. This time, he wanted to not only see those islands, he wanted to explore their legends and myths and how they were affected by the efforts of his great-grandfather and other missionaries.
Montgomery tells his story with a wry and highly observant eye. Although he used his travel writing credentials to arrange free transportation to Port Vila in the Vanuatu Islands (formerly the New Hebrides), Montgomery struck out on his own once in Melanesia. Here is his journey to one of the southernmost islands in the Vanuatu chain:
This I know: The ocean is not romantic. Not when you have left the calm of the harbor and the swell is up and the vomiting has begun. The ocean is not a gentle mother, not a bucking stallion, not an adversary you can grapple with. The ocean is a great rotting blanket that won’t be still. It is a pool of rancid milk. A gurgling toilet. Something to be endured. This is what I learned on my first sea passage.
Similarly, when in the Banks Islands several weeks later, Montgomery wants to visit a German anthropologist.
I had a map that showed a perfect red line wandering all the way west across Vanna Lava to Vureas Bay. Everyone in Sola insisted the red line was a road. But when Melanesians say “road,” they aren’t thinking about a highway or even a cart track. They mean there is a way. They mean that yes, once upon a time, perhaps someone walked in that direction.
Yet Montgomery’s travel adventures are essentially a colorful augmentation of his main stories. What Montgomery discovers in his journeys is that although religion pervades the islands, it is a far cry from what the missionaries may have ever envisioned.
Montgomery observes that “the real business of Port Vila . . . was religion.” The town is crawling with missionaries of various Christian sects and “[m]en shouted the gospel from street corners.” In a town on another island, he finds no less than four churches to serve 200 villagers. “The residents,” Montgomery notes, “drifted back and forth between faiths like butterflies on flowers.”
If Christianity is so predominant and there are so many churches, why all the missionaries? Montgomery obtains one answer from Kay Rudd, a missionary with the Joy Bible College in Port Vila.
“People might claim to be Christian,” Kay told me. “But voodoo, black magic, spirits . . . folks still live in utter fear of all these things. And you know, dear, a true Christian doesn’t have to be afraid.””Because ghosts and magic don’t exist,” I said. “You are helping people overcome their superstitions.”
Kay sighed and gave me a look of strained patience. “I didn’t say that. Evil is real. But Christians have the power to break the spell. If we can get Bibles into people’s hands, in their own languages, they will see they have the power to beat the black magic. They don’?t have to fear it.”
That is MontgomeryÂ?s first indication that not only is far more than Christianity actively practiced in the archipelagos, the alternatives are real and still wield great power. Virtually everywhere he visits, numerous aspects of prior polytheistic beliefs and traditions are alive and well. Just as the predominant language of the islands is a polyglot of English and French with Melanesian grammar and syntax, spiritual and religious practices are a unique mix. The Melanesians blend Christianity, magic, curses, ghosts, mana (an invisible force that animates life, objects, people and actions) and kastom (traditional religion, ritual and magic).
To the islanders, kastom is as important as Christian doctrine, if not more so. The Melanesians appear to invoke whatever seems best suited to them or their current needs. Montgomery notes that “the strangest bits of [Melanesian] culture were those that had been infected by Christianity,” because they produced a “hybridization of myths, magic, and spirit.” Thus, the shark god of the title refers to a traditional god for whom only one resident of a lagoon in the Solomon Islands is the conduit. On another island, a wedding ceremony in a Christian church is followed by a kastom ceremony.
Yet there is more than simply Montgomery’s desire to retrace his great-grandfather’s journey. He is also on a personal quest, a quest to see and experience traditional magic and any miracles it can produce. As he tells a representative of the national tourist agency on his arrival, “I’m looking for heathens.” That journey is transformative for Montgomery and in unexpected ways, ways that also reveal the importance and blend of both kastom and Christianity.
Montgomery tells each aspect of the story in easily readable yenthrallinging fashion. His description of a trip to and visit with a “prophet” on one island is reminiscent of Martin Sheen arriving to meet Marlon Brando in Apocalypse Now. Montgomery describes one locale as “a town anesthetized,” where the “lethargy was so thorough that nobody I met could be bothered to wrap their lips around the townÂ?s full name, let alone the full name of the island.” When he recounts his four days of a malarial delirium in this town, Montgomery takes us through hallucinations based on the Bible and tales of his family genealogy. Yet in Montgomery’s adept hands it all blends and flows.
Okay, Montgomery got a free flight and the islanders freely shared their kava, a drink made from a shrub of the same name that produced in Montgomery a “newfound feeling of transcendence.” He was not, however, spending his time imbibing while reclining in crisp linen sheets and watching the BBC. Montgomery visits the villages and remote areas of the islands in his search for the heathens and their practices. He travels with the natives and often lives with them. The result is a book that deserves to be short listed for any number of awards this year.
This, I thought, is what happens to cults when they mellow over time. They become religion.
Charles Montgomery, The Shark God
Given the number of comments he posted, Bill Stegmeier’s Saturday nights are evidently even more boring than mine. After I pointed out to him that jury verdicts in criminal cases had to be unanimous, he told me I was “stret[c]hing things” and asked for a hypothetical on how a juror could get sued.
I thought I explained it here and with real life cases here but let’s do it again.
Criminal case: The defendant in a criminal case testifies and presents other evidence that he was not even in the town where the crime occurred on the date it occurred. Since that evidence goes to the heart of the defense and the defendant’s entire case, those clearly are “material facts.” The jury convicts him of the crime charged.
The defendant appeals and the verdict is upheld because the jury is the sole judge of the facts and could choose to disbelieve the defendant’s evidence. There is no question jurors are entitled to “judicial immunity” and, thus, are “other persons claiming to be shielded by judicial immunity.” One of the express grounds for a J.A.I.L. complaint is a “deliberate disregard of material facts” and jurors meet the definition of judge in Amendment E. Given the evidence he presented, the defendant has grounds to file a complaint with the J.A.I.L. grand jury because he could have been convicted only if the jurors deliberately disregarded material facts, i.e., his alibi evidence. Moreover, he alleges that since it would be impossible for the jury to accidentally reject his evidence, it must have been deliberate. The grand jury must construe those allegations in his favor and not be persuaded to if the jurors artfully present the case that they didn’t believe him or his other evidence. The grand jury can allow the jurors to be sued.
Civil case: Assume a party in a contract dispute claims their signature on the contract is a forgery and presents handwriting experts who agree. The jury has to find against one party, thereby rejecting “material facts” of their case. Assume the Supreme Court upholds the jury verdict. Once again, J.A.I.L. allows the losing party to file a complaint because the jury necessarily engaged in “deliberate disregard of material facts.” Otherwise, it could never have reached a verdict.
This potential is far greater than many might think. A significant number of civil cases revolve around expert testimony presented by both sides. In fact, cases like medical malpractice or products liability generally require expert testimony. Plainly, then, such testimony constitutes material facts that are crucial to either side. In order to reach a verdict, the jury must accept one side’s “material facts” and reject (deliberately disregard) the other side’s. In each instance, then, the jurors face the potential for a J.A.I.L. complaint and a lawsuit against them.
School board president: Since Stegmeier initially asked how a school board president could be sued, I’ll also address that. Amendment E proponents say it also extends to actions that prevent “relevant evidence evidence from being admitted” or “relevant witnesses from testifying” and thereby “weakening one’s case.” Assume the school board president is presiding over a hearing on a petition to change the school district boundaries. He or she determines the board isn’t going to hear evidence or witnesses about another school district changing its boundaries, disagreeing with the petitioners over whether it is relevant. If the petition is denied, the petitioners can appeal. Let’s assume the board’s decision is upheld through the appeals. Under the scenario presented by J.A.I.L.ers, the petitioners can file a complaint seeking to sue the school board president because his or her decision (not the board’s) prevented what they contend to be relevant evidence or witnesses from being admitted, allegedly weakening their case. Since the J.A.I.L. grand jury must construe those allegationsin the petitioners’ favor, a prima facie case has been presented to strip immunity and allow the school board president to be sued, even if they have made an artful presentation on why that decision was right.
Note that in each of these cases there is no difficulty in ascertaining who made the decision. The criminal verdict was unanimous. If the civil verdict was not unanimous, the losing party can “poll” the jury to identify how each juror voted, thereby identifying potential J.A.I.L. defendants. The boundary change petitioners know exactly who ruled on the exclusion of evidence.
I am not the one stretching things. Rather, Amendment E stretches far beyond the confines of the judiciary, contrary to what Stegmeier and his followers would have the public believe.
Gentlemen, a court is no better than each man of you sitting before me on this jury. A court is only as sound as its jury, and a jury is only as sound as the men who make it up.
Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird
South Dakota’s J.A.I.L.ers are trumpeting a Zogby poll that J.A.I.L.er-in-Chief Bill Stegmeier supposedly commissioned. I agree with a comment Stegmeier left here about it. If the poll is accurate, it does prove how effective a campaign of lies can be.
I have not seen the actual poll, only what Stegmeier has said here and elsewhere. But a couple initial observations come to mind.
First, the question that was asked misstates what J.A.I.L. actually does. The question indicates J.A.I.L. is limited to complaints of misconduct against judges. A more accurate and honest statement would be: “The amendment would allow the creation of a citizen’s oversight committee or special grand jury which would hear complaints of alleged judicial misconduct against citizens serving on juries, school boards, city councils, county commissions, prosecutors and judges.” As PP asks with respect to other questions, do you think the poll might have come out differently? (By the way, where does the term “citizen’s oversight committee” appear in the amendment?)
Second, the cover letter indicates that “approximately 15 questions [were] asked.” Even taking into account use of questions to define sub-groups, we’re only seeing the response to one misleading question.
Finally, I note the poll involved about 300 fewer people than the KELO/Argus-Leader poll in July. As it’s been more than 20 years since I took a class in sampling and statistics, I have no clue if that impacts the results, particularly since it appears the Zogby poll was of “likely voters” whereas the older poll was of “registered voters.” I’ll leave that and future polls to the pundits.
I assume the No on E group and others have been polling. Quite frankly, the results of any poll are only as good as the question(s) asked. Given the limited and misleading description of J.A.I.L. in this poll, the results probably are not shocking, especially since even then one-third of the voters are “no” or undecided. The bottom line, though, remains that the poll, if accurate, reflects the sad but true fact that a whitewash can sucker the public.
It isn’t polls or public opinion of the moment that counts. It is right and wrong.
Harry S Truman
Since South Dakota J.A.I.L.er-in-Chief Bill Stegmeier posted a comment (and actually used his name on this visit), I’m happy to reply. Remember, this comment comes from the man who last year agreed Amendment E would apply to “every school board, city council, county commission, professional licensing board, in fact every citizen board in the state exercising quasi-judicial powers.”
First, he says because boards and commissions are already subject to suit “Amendment E does not make them ‘more sue-able.'” Wrong, as I’ve more fully explained here. Amendment E allows a suit to be authorized against any and “all other persons claiming to be shielded by judicial immunity.” Thus, even though a school board or county commission may have won in every court, a disgruntled litigant can still seek to have immunity stripped and bring suit, only this time not on grounds defined by the current constitution and statutes but for “weakening” someone’s case or “unreasonable delay.”
Stegmeier says it’s “laughable” Amendment E would allow a juror to be sued because they can only decide “innocent, guilty, or undecided.” (I’ve never seen “undecided” on a jury verdict form but we’ll assume it appears on verdict forms in Bill’s world.) Once again, I’ve previously explained how suit against a juror is possible. It boils down to J.A.I.L. allowing a suit against a person who can otherwise invoke judicial immunity if they are claimed to have engaged in “deliberate disregard of material facts,” which is, to quote Stegmeier, “one of the seven enumerated violations addressed in Section 2 of the amendment.” If a jury convicts a thief, rapist or murderer who put on an alibi defense, the defendant certainly can claim the jury deliberately disregarded what the defendant contends are material facts and can ask permission to sue the jury.
Stegmeier next looks to Black’s Law Dictionary to figure out what “judicial” means. While a good source, when it comes to Amendment E, we need to look to the language of the amendment itself. It defines “judge,” not Black’s. And Stegmeier’s claim that boards do not make “judicial” decisions is ludicrous. Perhaps someone should mention that to the state’s administrative law judges and the attorneys and parties who appear before state and local entities in contested case hearings all the time. It’s also interesting that Stegmeier disputes Judges Gors’s ruling that J.A.I.L. applies to more than judges. When Stegmeier appealed that ruling to the South Dakota Supreme Court, he “abandoned the argument that Constitutional Amendment E applies only to judges.” Once again, a different version in different forums.
The next piece of smoke is that boards, commissions and jurors only have “quasi-judicial” immunity, a term not mentioned in J.A.I.L. Recall again the definition of judge. It is someone claiming judicial immunity. It does not matter if it is called quasi-judicial, it is still judicial immunity that is invoked and claimed to apply.
Stegmeier then says the definition of “judge” was used only in case judges started calling themselves by a title like “your highness.” Sorry, but the title of the office comes from the South Dakota Constitution, not the judiciary itself. That doesn’t mean there couldn’t be a “your highness” amendment brought to the voters, though. After all, look what’s already on the ballot.
Finally, Stegmeier claims not to understand the mechanics of suing a school board president under Amendment E. Although I’ve explained it once, I will do so again. Appeals from school board decisions are based on certain statutory and constitutional grounds. Those grounds do not include such J.A.I.L. terms as “deliberate disregard of material facts” (although there are grounds that may allow a similar argument) or “unreasonable delay.” Once the litigant has attempted to exhaust judicial remedies, they would, as Stegmeier admits, be allowed to file a complaint with the special grand jury. But nothing in Amendment E says the suit has to be against the courts who heard the appeal. In his scenario, they were not the ones who allegedly violated J.A.I.L. Thus, the disgruntled litigant has every right under J.A.I.L. to seek to sue the board members individually. After all, doesn’t the definition of judge refer to “persons”? In fact, there is nothing on the face of J.A.I.L. that precludes someone from seeking to sue only those board members who voted against him or her on the basis those members deliberately disregard material facts.
While the grand jury is a buffer between the complaint and any actual suit, it is required to be prejudiced against the board member or other individual claiming immunity. J.A.I.L. requires that “[a]ll allegations in the complaint shall be liberally construed in favor of the complainant.” It also requires the grand jury to “not to be swayed by artful presentation” by the respondent. Were it not for the fact that people operating under J.A.I.L. have full immunity (you know, the stuff the J.A.I.L.ers don’t want anyone else to have), a failure to allow someone to sue a public official under these standards would appear to be a J.A.I.L. violation on its face.
When it gets down to it, I don’t think Stegmeier doesn’t understand J.A.I.L. He knows full well its scope, import and ramifications. He simply is an example of the phrase, “dumb as a fox.” He and the other J.A.I.L.ers figure it’s easier to sell a bill of goods if you gloss over the facts and what the amendment actually says and does. After all, isn’t that how you sell snake oil?
Next time, I’ll talk about Bill’s other comment on the poll he commissioned.
It is a general popular error to suppose the loudest complainers for the public to be the most anxious for its welfare.
Edmund Burke
Word is finally out that Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas visited the USD campus on Thursday. It was a “by invitation only” appearance that was kept secret for security reasons.
My oldest daughter was among those invited to meet with Thomas. I speculate that is because her honors paper last semester was on the religion clauses of the First Amendment and involved Thomas’s concurring opinion in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow. While I am proud of and quite happy for her, I find one aspect of the visit disconcerting.
Although the invited students have known Thomas was coming for some time, they were pledged to secrecy. As far as I know, neither the media nor the general public were aware of the visit until after it occurred. What does it say for the U.S. when our Supreme Court justices make appearances at public universities in secret? In particular, what are the ramifications in a state facing the J.A.I.L. measure when one of the top judges in the nation visits in secret? While I realize there are security issues, they certainly can be dealt with. To keep the lid on everything until after Thomas came and went not only seems antithetical to the concept of openness in a free society, it speaks poorly for the judiciary.
I am pleased a sitting Supreme Court justice came to the state. I am, however, dismayed by the secrecy and the fact a public university would agree to keep such an occasion under wraps and require its students to do the same.
Every thing secret degenerates, even the administration of justice; nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and publicity.
Lord John Dalberg-Acton
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