Blogroll

Odds and ends

Work and weekend travel lead to a brief recap of items:

  • The online version of The Nation looks at South Dakota’s abortion ban in a column titled Anatomy of a Bad Law. (Via How Appealing.)
  • Ron Hogan takes a look at the reaction to the NYT Book Review’s new science fiction column at Publisher’s Weekly with “outtakes” at his own blog.
  • Although he’s talking about the NHL, an ESPN columnist notes what I have been thinking at most hockey games I attend. (Via Off Wing Opinion).
  • PP and I got a little bit of national attention on the J.A.I.L. issue, noting that we come from opposite sides of the political aisle.
  • There’s other areas where the political winds in the South Dakota blogosphere merge when it comes to initiatives and referendums. I join PP, Clean Cut Kid and South Dakota Progressive in opposing any thought of making it more difficult to get initiated and referred measures on the ballot.

All the ills of democracy can be cured by more democracy.

Alfred E. Smith, June 27, 1933

J.A.I.L. Lies – Part 3

Here is the last installment (for now) examining the claims by promoters of South Dakota’s proposed Judicial Accountability Initiative law (J.A.I.L.) that it will not apply to anything other than the judiciary. In the first two posts, I looked at the how the arguments that J.A.I.L. only covers judges and “constitutional procedural issues” are contrary to the language of the amendment itself. The J.A.I.L.ers’ ultimate fallback position is “a litigant would have to first exhaust all judicial remedies which are presided over by judges having authority to finally rule on administrative proceedings involving constitutional questions.”

The last post explored how the contention that J.A.I.L. is limited to “proceedings involving constitutional questions” is untrue. Setting that aside, the exhaustion argument also is not necessarily what the amendment says.

Section 11 of the proposal says a complaint under J.A.I.L. can’t be considered “unless the complainant shall have first attempted to exhaust all judicial remedies available in this State within the immediately preceding six-month period.” Nothing says those remedies must be exhausted. Here’s a couple examples of what could occur under this language.

Assume a J.A.I.L.er is sued by another citizen or brought before a state licensing board. J.A.I.L.er asks the court or agency to throw out the case arguing it has no basis in law (a motion to dismiss) or the facts do not support the claim against him (a motion for summary judgment). The motion is denied. Such rulings are not immediately appealable. The J.A.I.L.er could, however, seek a discretionary intermediate appeal. Assume the reviewing court denies the request. Six months and two days later the J.A.I.L.er files a complaint with the “special grand jury.” Did the J.A.I.L.er not in fact attempt to exhaust all judicial remedies that were available in preceding six months?

Or suppose a J.A.I.L.er’s workers’ compensation claim is denied following a hearing before the Department of Labor. Under the law, he or she has 30 days to appeal. J.A.I.L.er, intentionally or not, files the appeal 32 days later and it is dismissed. By at least filing the paperwork, has the J.A.I.L.er not “attempted” to exhaust all available judicial remedies?

Moreover, the exhaustion provision specifically excludes section 17 of the amendment. That section says “a complaint for criminal conduct against a judge may be brought directly to the Special Grand Jury” if certain conditions are met. In other words, rather than appeal, if a J.A.I.L.er meets the requirements of section 17 (which would not be difficult) they can file a criminal complaint with the “grand jury.” Don’t think that would happen? Recall that Bill Stegmeier, who heads South Dakota’s J.A.I.L. effort, recently accused the entire state Legislature of criminal conduct for adopting a resolution urging voters to reject J.A.I.L. Stegmeier told his J.A.I.L. “Gang,” that he was simply trying to hold the Legislature accountable for illegal actions, “just like we are proposing to do with the judges.” Why appeal when you disagree with a decision if you can just yell criminal conduct, such as perhaps claiming the judge is guilty of failing to perform an official duty?

Will any of these situations arise and allow a J.A.I.L. complaint to proceed? No one knows. But that alone demonstrates that anyone who contends the amendment wholly forbids filing a J.A.I.L. complaint until any and all possible appeals are complete is ignoring the very language of the proposal.

More installments in the J.A.I.L. series will be posted in the coming months. These include looking at the changing and contradictory arguments of J.A.I.L. author Ron Branson on the meaning and scope of the measure and exploring more of the misrepresentations and misstatements J.A.I.L.ers make in claiming their piece of excrement is the salvation of the state and nation.


Never underestimate the power of human stupidity.

Robert A. Heinlein, Time Enough for Love

Review: Bound by Law? (2006)

It seems appropriate that the first image you see when you open this work is reminiscent of the Crypt Keeper. After all, the topic is something most people fear — law. In fact, the specific area, copyright law, even causes the knees of some lawyers to quake.

Bound by Law? is a comic book (or graphic novel if you prefer) issued by the Center for the Study of the Public Domain at Duke Law School. It seeks to explain to the layperson two of the thornier issues in modern copyright law for writers, musicians, artists and filmmakers.

Basically, the work (written by James Boyle and Jennifer Jenkins and illustrated by Keith Aoki) uses a documentary filmmaker to examine the impact of the doctrines of “public domain” and “fair use.” The public domain is comprised of material on which copyright never existed or has expired and, hence, can be freely used by the public at large. Fair use is a statutory exception to the copyright laws that allows use of portions of copyrighted material for a variety of purposes as long as the use doesn’t exceed the boundaries of a four-factor test the law establishes.

Why a comic book and a focus on documentary filmmaking? Because they are excellent vehicles for exploring the issues.

The work’s filmmaker wants to make a documentary of the day in the life of New York City. She encounters what anyone would, albeit perhaps to a greater degree. Almost everywhere she goes there is copyrighted or trademarked material: music on the street or in a nightclub; a program or movie on the television in a particular room; or the logos that are ubiquitous at almost any sporting event. To figure out if she can use any or all of these materials without being sued for copyright infringement, she needs to sort out whether the material is protected or in the public domain. If it is protected, does her use constitute fair use?

Similarly, a comic book graphically demonstrates the seemingly endless circles and mazes in which an artist or writer can be led trying to sort out these questions. Bound by Law? also frequently relies on a montage or mix approach that displays how material which may or may not be in the public domain or may or may not be copyrighted plays a role in the expression of ideas. The latter is used to particular effect. As might be expected from strong advocates of the fair use doctrine, the book is replete with undoubtedly copyrighted and trademarked images, logos and symbols. Thus, the comic book not only illustrates but makes a point far better than a traditional written work.

The problem today is at least two-fold. First, Congress has repeatedly changed and extended the length of time before copyrighted work falls into the public domain. These actions have effectively resulted in most of 20th Century culture being protected for almost 100 years. Likewise, much of the material published today likely will be protected into the 22nd Century.

The problem with fair use stems not only from a lack of clear rules but also the fact some copyright holders have taken a very tough — some might say extortionate — stance. Bound by Law points out a variety situations in which works had to be cut or modified because of the money the copyright holder demanded in exchange for using a few seconds or snippet of their material.

Bound by Law? brings these complex issues across is a simple, enjoyable style. Not only does it show the firsthand impact of the problems, it also educates about a variety of relevant court decisions. It is also a commentary on trying to make intellectual property law a benefit rather than a hindrance to modern creative work. Some of its references in this regard are subtle, others more straightforward.

The former is seen from the outset. In the very first panel, the book quietly acknowledges the contributions of Lawrence Lessig, a Stanford University law professor in the forefront of arguing that intellectual property laws are hindering creative freedom and technology. Lessig isn’t mentioned in the panel. Rather, the titles of several of his books appear on a bookshelf, together with the titles of other works exploring how copyright fits with new media and new technology. Lessig makes a later cameo appearance as the Statute of Liberty, holding a video camera as his torch and a copy of his most recent work in lieu of a tablet in the left hand.

More explicit is a closing discussion of “cultural environmentalism” as an approach for a future copyright system. Initially proposed by Boyle a decade ago, the theory is that just as the environmental movement demonstrated the impact social and policy decisions had on the environment, cultural environmentalists should show the public how intellectual property laws affect culture. The idea has taken root among a wide number of individuals (including Lessig) who continue to examine how to strike a balance between protecting intellectual property and encouraging creativity in an increasingly remixed culture.

Bound by Law? won’t qualify anyone for membership in any professional organizations dedicated to intellectual property law. In fact, carrying it might alone be sufficient to keep a person out of some of those groups. But the aim isn’t to make readers intellectual property experts. Rather, the goal is to educate artists and the public about current issues and provide commentary by those who believe copyright law must be fixed to remain a useful tool in a digital world. And, speaking from experience, a comic book is a helluva a better way to learn this than a case book or law review article.


The question of “fair use” can seem like a game of blind man’s bluff or a surrealist garden of intellectual property delights.

Bound by Law?

Marginalia, dicta and miscellany

Taking a break from J.A.I.L., here’s a few recent items of interest:

  • As Rick over at The Agony Column broadens his review subjects, he looks at Karen Armstrong’s latest (which has been added to my “wish list”).
  • Barnes & Noble has launched an online site to sell your used books, although it appears to be directed more toward textbooks. (Via The Millions).
  • Did Justice Scalia prejudge the Hamdan case argued Tuesday? Audio of the argument is available here and the Surpeme Court has posted a written transcript (PDF file).
  • Straight Talk looks at the potential political fallout in a post-HB1215 (abortion ban) world.
  • All I can say is cool picture! (And it may become my new computer desktop). (Via Beyond the Beyond).
  • With USHL and NCAA hockey playoffs in full swing, Chris from the Western College Hockey blog posts an interesting piece on NCAA tourney ticket prices at another of his blogs. And a sportswriter in Kearney, Neb., raises the question: who will be better at picking the USHL playoff winners, him or his dog? (Loyalty requires me to point out they both erred on who will win the Stampede/Tri-City series that starts tonight).

Every day is a great day for hockey.

Mario Lemeiux

J.A.I.L. Lies – Part 2

My last post on the South Dakota’s Judicial Accountability Initiative Law (J.A.I.L.) addressed the efforts of J.A.I.L.ers to claim the proposed constitutional amendment applies only to the judiciary. Today we’ll explore another of the arguments on this point made by “Barbie” of the national J.A.I.L. organization, specifically the contention that the amendment applies only to “officials authorized to make final rulings on constitutional questions.”

Her statement is proved false by Section 2 of the amendment, ironically the very section she relies upon in it. That section eliminates immunity for “any deliberate violation of law, fraud or conspiracy, intentional violation of due process of law, deliberate disregard of material facts, judicial acts without jurisdiction, blocking of a lawful conclusion of a case, or any deliberate violation of the Constitutions of South Dakota or the United States[.]” (Emphasis added).

Not only does this part of the proposal make no reference to “constitutional procedural issues,” that phrase does not appear anywhere in J.A.I.L. More important, anyone who can open a dictionary knows that “or” means the terms listed are in the alternative. Thus, the express language of section 2 doesn’t require a deliberate violation of the constitution or fraud for a complaint to be filed under J.A.I.L. Any one of the situations it contemplates is alone sufficient.

So, if someone doesn’t t like how the administrative law judge ruled in their unemployment compensation hearing, they can be hauled before the J.A.I.L. grand jury on the basis they deliberately disregarded what the claimant considered material facts. J.A.I.L.ers can do the same thing if a state or local licensing board imposes sanctions on them or revokes their license.

And what about “blocking” the lawful conclusion of a case? Section 1(a) of the amendment defines blocking as “[a]ny act that impedes the lawful conclusion of a case, to include unreasonable delay[.]” Under the plain language of that definition, a J.A.I.L.er could invoke the amendment if an agency engaged in a quasi-judicial function moves back the date of a hearing over the J.A.I.L.er’s objection. After all, the definition covers any act that impedes wrapping up the case.

Like so many other arguments it makes, the claim by J.A.I.L. that the amendment will apply only when constitutional matters are involved is invented out of whole cloth. While it can come into play if there is a deliberate violation of the state or federal constitution, that is only one of eight grounds a J.A.I.L.er can invoke to take matters into the hands of a J.A.I.L. “grand jury.”

The next installment is the last one (for the time being) on the contention that J.A.I.L. will only apply to the judiciary. It will address the “exhaustion of remedies” argument J.A.I.L.ers invoke.


[L]ies are like huge, gaudy vessels, the rafters of which are rotten and wormeaten, and those who embark in them are fated to be shipwrecked.

Gospel of Buddha